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INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND 
THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER
Alessandro Capone
Abstract: In this paper I address several problems raised by Wayne Davis (p.c.)to 
my treatment of slurring in indirect reports. Although the paper presents several 
general considerations on slurs, it is mainly a contribution on indirect reports and 
the social practice in which they are embedded. The author embraces a Wittgen-
steinian approach concerning the social praxis of indirect reports and claims that, 
due to pragmatic principles or conventions of language use, the reported speaker 
is, in general, responsible for the slurring (in indirect reports), while the reporter is 
usually complicit, because he could have chosen to sum up the report using a more 
neutral term. It follows from Searle’s Principle of Expressibility that one can report 
a slurring utterance with the intention of criticizing it – in which case it is important 
to attribute the slur to the reported speaker. Various revisions of a principle for 
indirect reporting are offered, in the light of criticism by Wayne Davis.
Keywords: pragmatics, explicatures, indirect reports, language games, slurring, 
Wayne Davis’s ideas on meaning.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pragmatics goes beyond sentential semantics and may even intrude 
into it, if we follow the current trends on the semantics/pragmatics de-
bate. In many cases I have demonstrated the importance of pragmatic 
intrusion, in connection with belief reports, indirect reports, attribu-
tive/referential uses of NPs, knowing that vs. knowing how, «de se», 
Immunity to Error through misidentification, quotation, etc., although 
I have been somehow reluctant to accept some of the standard exam-
ples of pragmatic intrusion found in the literature. Of course, even the 
use of the term «pragmatic intrusion» (due to Levinson 2000), may 
be problematic and controversial. A referee once noted that pragmat-
ics is part of truth-conditional pragmatics, while the term «intrusion» 
may be misleading and may indicate that one takes pragmatics to be 
of secondary importance. Anyway, theorists may distinguish between 
linguistic semantics, which may only provide skeletal information to 
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be integrated with pragmatic information (at a later stage) and truth-
conditional pragmatics (an admission that semantics without pragmat-
ics cannot be truth-conditional).
I quite agree that pragmatics plays an important role in integrat-
ing semantic information. In this paper, I deal with the complicated 
issue of polyphony, pragmatics being involved in the attempt to distin-
guish voices (the original speaker’s voice and the indirect reporter’s). 
As I said about quotation, pragmatics is responsible for allocating 
quotation marks. In indirect reports, pragmatics is responsible in the 
complex task of indicating mixed quotation.
The structure of this paper is as follows. I follow general consid-
erations on the issue of slurs and then on the issue of indirect reports. 
I propose that indirect reports are language games involving a poly-
phonic activity. The problem for the hearer is to recognize different 
voices. When slurs are injected into that-clauses of indirect reports, 
we have interpretative ambiguities. My proposal is that the original 
speaker is assigned responsibility for the slurring expression present in 
the that-clause of an indirect reports. I justify this claim by a) consid-
erations on processing efforts and contextual effects; b) considerations 
based on Searle’s Principle of expressibility; c) considerations based on 
the comparison between quotation and indirect reports; d) considera-
tions on critical discourse analysis. Since my pragmatic considerations 
are based on my paraphrasis/form principle, I have to defend such a 
principle from reasonable objections by Wayne Davis.
2. THE PRObLEM
I would like to make it clear from the start that this is a paper about 
indirect reporting as a social practice (in other previous papers: Ca-
pone 2012; Capone, Salmani Nodoushan 2014), in fact, I discussed 
indirect reporting as a language game) and this is not a paper about 
slurs or slurring in general, although I am intrigued by the follow-
ing question: what happens when one indirectly reports an utterance 
which contains a slurring expression? An interpretative ambiguity (in 
the sense of Jaszczolt 1999) is certainly created, as one may have to de-
cide whether the slurring expression belongs to the primary voice (the 
reporting speaker) or the secondary voice (the reported speaker). An-
other way of formulating this ambiguity is to say that we have to ascer-
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tain whether the slurring expression is part of the reporting utterance 
or of the reported utterance. Intuitively, this interpretative ambiguity 
must be captured syntactically, because if the reporting speaker is be-
ing attributed the slur, then intuitively the reported utterance must be 
characterized as containing a neutral counterpart, while the slurring 
expression must occur in the embedding utterance, probably as a sort 
of free enrichment (one of the types discussed by Carston 2002 or Ali-
son Hall 2013), being part of an appositive structure:
(1)
John said that Mary is a nigger
could be represented as:
John said that Mary is black (which I am paraphrasing as «Mary is a nig-
ger»)
Instead, the interpretation on which «nigger» only belongs to 
the reported speaker’s voice amounts to something like the following:
John said that Mary is a nigger
can be represented as:
(2)
John said that Mary is a nigger and what John said contains the words 
«Mary» and «nigger». 
Here too we have free enrichment, which I have characterized 
as conjunction. But I could have characterized it as I did in Capone 
(2008) and in Capone (2013a) as a sentential null appositive. I will not 
go into this, because the topic of this paper is not the issue of «opacity» 
per se, but the issue of multiple voicing and the issue of who is respon-
sible for the slurring expression in indirect reporting.
3. ON SLURS
We need to say a little bit on slurs, but only as a way of getting into a 
more general problem about indirect reporting. A slurring expression 
ALESSANDRO CAPONE
304
is an expression which is derogatory and often used with the purpose 
of inflicting harm to some category of people (see Saka 1998; 2007), 
of stabilizing a situation of dominance/inferiority, an expression which 
society as a whole should not use due to some convention that offi-
cially bans its usage (a social stipulation according to Anderson and 
Lepore, who even write about an «edict») even if certain segments of 
society, in fact, use it. Those who use slurs can be recognized as having 
racist intentions. Slurs, however, can be used by the members of the 
categories slurred, because by re-appropriating a slur one can show a 
sense of solidarity with those who suffer due to an unjust society and 
neutralize its potential to cause harm. Re-appropriation is an impor-
tant topic, and I can here recommend two papers by Claudia Bianchi 
(in press) and Andrew Jacobs (2002) on this.
Most importantly, I should say that contexts can take away the 
bite from slurs, as happens in academic papers and, in particular, in 
this paper. Of course, it is possible that the menacing features of slurs 
do not completely dissolve, as they are still associated with a history 
of injustice and sadism as pointed out by Kennedy (2002) in his mag-
isterial work on slurs (in afro-american communities) and American 
history. 
4. ON THE CONNECTION bETWEEN INDIRECT RE-
PORTS, SLURS AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Now apropos of the issue of making use of examples in academic con-
texts, consider the following situation: you enter a classroom and read 
a sentence on the blackboard. You know that this lecture room usually 
hosts lectures on syntax by a certain professor Higginbotham. You do 
not know who authored the sentence and specifically you do not know 
whether the sentence has to be counted as a mere sentence or as an ut-
terance. You need to assign some illocutionary force to that sentence, 
to make sense of it from a communicative point of view. Now, in this 
case it is clearly difficult to know what to make of the sentence, but as 
a default you would tend to think the sentence is merely an example of 
a sentence if utilized in say a grammar class. In this case, I am utilizing 
sentences as examples, but even as examples they have the potential 
to offend. I do not know whether it is enough to profess that I have 
always been opposed to racism, as the history of these sentences per-
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colates up from the blackboard or from the pages of this paper, but 
at least in these prefatory considerations I will do whatever is in my 
power to neutralize language’s ability to do harm and cause suffering. 
I believe we can use language to disarm racist discourse and that to do 
so, we need to be able to make reference to that discourse by a method 
which is the counterpart of indirect reporting. In a sense I am anticipa-
ting the main line of my argument, as it is crucial to my considerations 
that we need expressive power to disarm slurring expressions and such 
expressive power needs to be reflected in the ability of talking about 
slurring utterances without being complicit with those who uttered the 
slurring utterances.
5. INDIRECT REPORTINg AS A SOCIAL ACTIVITY
Indirect reporting is a discourse practice which is social, being learned 
in the course of interacting with people, although certain presumably 
innate principles of human rationality determine the direction of the 
inferential processes that are involved in it. Presumably indirect repor-
ting is different from direct quotation, so the literature says, although 
in my paper on quotation (Capone 2013b) I have done my best to say 
that the interpretation of quotation is radically pragmatic and although 
important cases of mixed quotation in indirect reports are recognized 
by the current literature. If such considerations are held in mind, it is 
clear that the border-line between direct and indirect reports is being 
corroded more and more. To give you an example of the extent to 
which this demarcating line can be corroded, take the following:
(3)
Mary:
John said: «Louise is very intelligent»
However, it is not true that John uttered «Louise» or «intelli-
gent» as literal constituents of what he said. Although I should say that 
these cases are rare, I would not want to say that they are special or 
parasitic uses. Even if they were, pragmatics would have to intervene. 
If the hearer replied: «But John never calls me “Louise”», it would be 
clear that the presuppositions of discourse would militate towards an 
interpretation of the direct report as an indirect report, to be recon-
structed on the basis of assumptions that are in the air during the con-
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versation. (Now I should probably add that my competence as Italian 
speaker colors these considerations).
This case reminds us of the radical pragmatics involved in Bezui-
denhout’s (1997) examples in which a NP (in particular a pronominal) 
which is preferentially associated with a referential interpretation, is 
interpreted in context as having an attributive interpretation. Context, 
we know well, has such transformative powers.
The problems of mixed quotation (discussed by Cappelen, 
Lepore 2005) do not scare the pragmalinguist, because the polyphonic 
game is an essential part of indirect reporting (as I proposed in Capone 
2013c). The participants to a conversation can recognize the voice of 
a certain person, through certain linguistic clues (style may be an im-
portant indicator), or through some phonetic qualities (one should not 
exaggerate to what extent people are capable of imitating a person’s 
voice (this is certainly true for Italian speakers who have great dramat-
ic potential). However, in the absence of such clues, one would mainly 
have to rely on the cognitive makeup of the speakers/hearers who are 
capable of drawing inferences that assign by default a certain token 
of a lexeme to a certain speaker. In any case, rationality principles à la 
Grice would also make the same kind of predictions, without having to 
place a burden on the cognitive make-up of the conversationalists.
Indirect reporting, as a social practice or a language game, in-
volves a certain number of transformations. Ignoring the most obvious 
ones, that concern pronominals and tense, there are some transfor-
mation on which interesting discussion might focus. An utterance (or 
rather a sequence of utterances) can be reported by providing a sum-
mary. Certain modifiers could be omitted. Syntactic errors could be 
amended. (However, I exclude that the opposite process of injecting 
syntactic errors is licit (if the reporting speaker does so, he will be per-
ceived as responsible for the errors). Pauses could be deleted. Iden-
tificatory materials might be added (say appositive clauses). Is there 
a limit to what can be done in indirect reporting? I would like to say 
that one limit is the speaker’s meaning (although there are important 
qualifications to be made here). Another limit is the reported speaker’s 
perception that the paraphrasis of his or her utterance has not been 
fair (We shall see here an important qualification, in response to an 
objection by Wayne Davis). 
Speaker’s meaning, by default, is or should be the aim of indirect 
reporting (see Wieland 2013, Capone 2013c). This is perhaps most 
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evident in the case of the law. When we interpret the law, as a number 
of scholars including Carston (2013) say, we are basically interested 
in what the law-maker said – the literal import is not of interest to us, 
but we need to contextualize what was said to arrive at some plausible 
intentions (of course speaking of intentions in the case of the law is not 
devoid of difficulties as pointed out by Marmor 2013). I am interested 
in the law, because the acts of interpretation after all are nothing but in-
direct reports of what the law-makers said or decided. Now, the case of 
the law shows without doubt that indirect reporting involves decipher-
ing the speaker’s meaning. In this paper, we are interested in speaker’s 
meanings, but we should say that there are cases in which indirect 
reports focus on literal meanings. This should not be impossible be-
cause if direct reports can be used to produce indirect reports, indirect 
reports can be used to achieve something similar to direct reports (per-
haps with an important difference, direct reports usually provide all of 
what is said, even small details, while indirect reports cannot promise 
to deliver all small details of what was said, given the possibility of sum-
ming up what was said. In the cases in which indirect reports focus on 
literal meanings, we expect strong clues (in the sense of Dascal, Weiz-
man 1987) to be there to indicate how the utterance has to be taken.
6. RESPONSIbILITY fOR SLURS IN INDIRECT REPORTS 
AND PRAgMATICS
Anderson and Lepore propose that in indirect reports the reporting 
speaker, rather than the reported speaker, is responsible for the slur-
ring expression appearing in the embedded that-clause. Now, while 
I accept that in some cases, the reporting speaker can be complicit 
in uttering the slurring expression, I am inclined to accept that the 
reported speaker has greater responsibility than the reporting speaker 
– intuitively because the indirect report is about the reported speaker 
and NOT the reporting speaker.
I would say that the pragmatic considerations I expressed in Ca-
pone (2010; 2012; 2013c) assign responsibility for the slur to the re-
ported speaker, while the responsibility of the reporter consists in not 
having avoided the slur choosing a more neutral counterpart. Howev-
er, if a more neutral counterpart had been chosen, how could we know 
that the original speaker was responsible for slurring? This is a damn 
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complicated question. We may get the idea that the reporting speaker 
was complicit in the slurring, however his responsibility for the slur-
ring was inferior. And there are contexts in which the responsibility of 
the reporter has been completely corroded (take the current paper or 
a judiciary proceeding).
In my opinion, there should be ways to signal that the reporter 
is not primarily responsible for the slurring expression (here contex-
tual clues could be mobilized to convey that that reporter’s standard 
vocabulary does not include slurs and therefore by deduction, respon-
sibility for the slurring is shifted to the reported speaker. Furthermore, 
pragmatic default inferences also contribute to assign responsibility to 
the reported speaker, as the interpretation that the perspective of the 
reported speaker is being adopted is more relevant – relevance being 
the ratio between contextual effects and processing efforts. An inter-
pretation according to which either the reported speaker or the re-
porting speaker or both could be responsible for the slurring is clearly 
non-economical with respect to the possibility that one alone was re-
sponsible. If the reporting speaker was responsible for the slurring 
(and not the reported speaker), the reporting speaker could certainly 
be guilty of lack of clarity and the processing efforts would be greater. 
However, if the original speaker was responsible for the slurring, the 
interpretation would be the most relevant one since the perspective of 
the original speaker is what counts and what the hearer is interested in. 
The hearer does not want to know what the reporting speaker thinks, 
but only what the reported speaker thinks.
In Capone (2010, 2013c) I drew the readers’ attention to the 
following.
7. PARAPHRASIS/fORM PRINCIPLE
The that-clause embedded in the verb «say» is a paraphrasis of what Y 
said, and meets the following constraints:
Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with 
it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original 
utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion 
made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of 
its form/style (Capone 2013c, 174).
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In Capone (2010) I drew this principle from the principle of 
Relevance, but this is not at stake here. 
Now, the paraphrasis/Form principle clearly predicts that if a 
speaker did not utter a slurring expression in her utterance, she would 
not like/accept being reported as having uttered that word. Hence the 
obligation by the indirect reporter to avoid using that word, as such 
use would cast a sinister shadow on the reported speaker depicting her 
as racist (when she is not). There is a complication here, because while 
the reported speaker never uttered the word «nigro» or «nigger», she 
may have wanted to utter it. The indirect reporter knows well that the 
slur was not uttered, but she also knows that if she had been permit-
ted, the speaker would have willingly uttered it (she was prevented by 
political circumstances). Perhaps the reported speaker used the word 
«black» with derogatory intonation, or perhaps when this word was 
uttered the speaker’s face was illuminated by a sinister grimace. Per-
haps the reporting speaker merely guessed at the intention behind the 
word. So, should we take the reporting speaker who injects «nigger» 
into the that clause of his report at face value and attribute it to the 
reported speaker or not? My story predicts that even if the reporting 
speaker was wrong in his choice of «nigger», pragmatics says that the 
reported speaker is represented as being racist.
That these semantic/pragmatic considerations should be taken 
into account is obvious, if one considers that accepting the alternative 
account by Anderson and Lepore (2013) commits one to the view that 
an indirect report of a slurring expression is subject to a double prohi-
bition (both the original speaker and the reported one are prohibited 
from uttering the slurring expression) and nevertheless the indirect re-
port of a slurring expression gets by. Why is it that it gets by? Because 
it is important to someone that she know about the slurring utterance 
in the first place and this can be achieved only through reporting the 
slurring expression. It appears that the prohibition was evaded twice. 
Instead, a view that the reporting speaker is simply quoting (admit-
tedly mixed-quoting) a speaker would ensure that only one person is 
guilty for the slurring – and this is the desired result, because ideally 
we would want to make a difference between the original culprit and 
the reporter who may be non-racist and whose purpose is (possibly) 
to denounce a racist remark. In Anderson and Lepore’s (2013) view 
accusing someone of slurring is something that can occur in the court 
(presumably) but not in ordinary conversation. Yet, we have evidence 
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that in ordinary conversations too we utter pronouncements against 
immoral and illicit conducts.
8. ARgUMENTS fOR THE VIEW THAT THE REPORTED 
SPEAKER IS RESPONSIbLE fOR SLURS IN THAT-
CLAUSES Of INDIRECT REPORTS
In the remainder of this paper, I will expatiate on the reasons for belie-
ving that the story of indirect reports and slurs should proceed the way 
I have depicted it. I will advance a number of arguments, examining 
their consequences.
The first argument is based on expressivity. We must be able to 
express what we think. Searle says: «Whatever can be meant can be 
said» (Searle 1969, 20). In the case of indirect reporting, we must have 
a way to report an offensive speech event (for the purpose of denounc-
ing it) without committing/repeating the same offence. Clearly, one 
can resort to euphemistic ways of saying things or one can be indirect 
and use convoluted sentences that give the hearer an idea of what was 
done in the offensive utterance. To give you an example, one of our 
colleagues, who was known by everyone to be crazy, once said in the 
common room that «Berlusconi ha il pisello piccolo» (Berlusconi has 
a small dick). I then interpreted this utterance literally, although now 
it occurs to me that this was probably a way of saying that Berlusconi 
is not capable of governing the country, if an analogy is followed with 
another expression which idiomatically means that «Berlusconi non 
ha le palle (per governare il paese)». Perhaps this teacher had trans-
formed the idiomatic form into an unidiomatic form. Whatever the 
case, I wanted to tell other colleagues what had happened, but I was 
terribly embarrassed to let the female teachers know. The taboo as-
sociated with this sentence was making its sting felt. However, there 
was no way to report the utterance without appearing to commit the 
same offence. But surely, if one had to report the utterance, one had to 
do so in a way that revealed the words used. Thus, as a consequence 
of Searle’s principle of expressibility, a speaker must be in a position 
to make an indirect report of something that is obscene relying on the 
context or pragmatic principles to impute the offensive phrase to the 
reported speaker. There must be contexts, such as a court, where one 
must be able to tell the whole truth about what was said.
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The second argument exploits a parallel between quotation and 
indirect reporting. If we accept Anderson and Lepore’s view that there 
is a societal prohibition against uttering a slurring expression, it is clear 
that this should apply to quotation as well. Thus a sentence such as 
(4)
Mary said: John is a nigger
should be as infelicitous as the corresponding indirect report «Mary 
said that John is a nigger». Here my opponent may reply that, after all, 
Anderson and Lepore think of a prohibition against using, rather than 
against «mentioning» (in the sense of Lyons 1977) a slurring expres-
sion. I quite agree that quotative structures, in general, are associated 
with opacity and sometimes mention, rather than using, certain ex-
pressions. However, even accepting the using/mentioning distinction, 
it should be said that the distinction does not neatly correlate with 
the distinction between indirect reporting and quoting. In fact, we 
have seen that quotation structures can, in context, amount to indirect 
reporting. Furthermore, as Cappelen and Lepore (2005) themselves 
note, indirect reports exhibit the phenomenon of mixed quotation. 
Thus there are segments of indirect reports that are mentioned. We 
can easily have reports such as John said that «apple» has five letters. 
If anything, we would expect quotations to host slurring expressions, 
while indirect reporting should not. However, in practice there is not 
much difference between quotation and indirect reporting.
The third argument is based on critical linguistics (on this, see 
Linda Waugh et al. 2014). If we want to expunge racism, we should be 
able to denounce it and we should be able to talk about it, rather than 
being scared to talk about it. Denouncing racism involves describing 
the kind of speech acts performed by people during their racist prac-
tices. It is clear that in doing so, we should be able to report utterances 
verbatim or close to verbatim, our moral authority sufficing to exclude 
that we are complicit in this kind of discourse. We should take posi-
tion in public and this should be enough to label us as non-racists 
and to bracket the racist linguistic practices. Indirect reporting is a 
way of bracketing slurring expressions, which appear as enveloped in 
inverted commas. Contextual considerations combined with default 




9. ObjECTIONS bY WAYNE DAVIS
The job is done egregiously by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle, which 
however was attacked by Wayne Davis in a personal communication. 
There are two fundamental objections.
Consider the following example:
(5)
Billy: The first black person was elected U.S. president in 2008.
Tommy: Billy said that the first nigger was elected U.S. president in 2008.
Wayne Davis writes:
I would say that Tommy’s report is false. But your constraint need not be 
violated. Billy may not object at all to Tommy’s way of reporting what he 
said and may have been just as happy using «nigger» in place of what he 
said. Billy may take it as a fair paraphrasis of what he said. But it is not, so 
Tommy’s report is false. It is also an unacceptable thing to say, whether or 
not Billy objects to it.
I quite agree that this is a plausible objection. But this is seen 
from the point of view of a racist speaker. So my prediction makes a 
difference between racist and non-racist speakers. It works in the case 
of non-racist speakers but not in the case of racist speakers. 
We could try to revise my Principle:
Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with 
it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original 
utterance. Furthermore, in case he were to accept certain norms that are 
standard or should be standard in society, he would not object to vocal-
izing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 
«that» on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013c, 174)
Now, I should say that these contextual injections of clauses 
could go on in case other objections are raised. I doubt that all such 
clauses should be made explicit, as principles should have a general 
validity even if they are in need of being constantly enriched through 
contextualizations.
A better treatment of Wayne Davis’ objection could be the fol-
lowing:
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An indirect report of an utterance by X cannot be felicitous UNLESS X is 
inclined to approve if it on account of its content and form/style or some 
impartial judge is inclined to accept it on account of its content/form/style 
given what was said by the original speaker.
The case by Davis is ruled out because the reported speaker did 
not utter a slurring expression and although he would probably have 
approved of it, either he or the impartial judge would agree that what 
he said did not include a slurring expression: thus, if the slurring ex-
pression features in the indirect report, despite the fact that it was 
not uttered by the original speaker, it must be construed as under the 
responsibility of the reporting speaker.
The upshot of this is the following: if a slurring expression fea-
tures in the that-clause of an indirect report, assume that the slur is 
under the responsibility of the original speaker, because if the original 
speaker had not uttered it, the reporter would not have had the right 
to report it, given that either the original speaker or the impartial judge 
would object to its presence in the that-clause of the indirect report.
I take that indirect reports typically display the words used in 
speech by the original speaker. I believe that it is more natural that the 
indirect report should express the words used by the reported speaker 
rather than those of the reported speaker, because the indirect report 
is intended to reflect the utterance of the reported speaker.
Wayne Davis objects to this. He says:
This may be true in some cases, but only when the reporter is using the 
same language as the reported speaker. It is also false in the same-language 
case when the reported speaker uses a lot of contractions or regionalisms 
that are inappropriate in the reporter’s context or uses misspellings or 
mispronounciations.
Let us leave aside the different-language case, as here contextual 
considerations advert the hearers that it is not possible that the same 
words uttered by the original speaker are used by the indirect reporter. 
This is a notable exception, but I never claimed that my principle cov-
ers all cases. It is predictable that defaults in interpretation can be 
overridden by contextual considerations. 
It is true that as Davis says, indirect reports can change the 
words, they can eliminate grammatical errors, misspellings, regional-
isms etc. However, there is intuitively a difference between an indi-
rect report that eliminates all such problems and an indirect report 
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that introduces such problems. In the former case, a speaker should 
not be entirely unhappy about the reporter’s charitable attitude and 
thus my principle may not be refuted by such a case. In the latter 
case, errors are being introduced on purpose (or perhaps involun-
tarily). But certainly, the original speaker should not be happy with 
the result. Such an attitude is clearly reflected in my Principle. Of 
course, a third case could be pondered on. A person who is particu-
larly proud of belonging to a certain region, objects to the fact that 
the indirect reporter eliminated a certain regionalism. But this case 
too is covered by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle. In fact, the original 
speaker objects to the change or interpolation by the reporter, as I 
predicted. Whatever the success of my reply strategy, I would like to 
say that though I greatly appreciate the merit of Wayne Davis’s objec-
tion, I object to his objection on general grounds. Of course I never 
said or would like to say that all the words used in the indirect report 
belong to the original speaker. In some cases, it may not be important 
to decide whether a word was part of the original speaker’s speech 
or was just a synonym used for convenience. The Paraphrasis/Form 
principle applies only when it is relevant, that is in the case of prob-
lematic words. If a word rather than another makes an important 
difference, in that the indirect report ends up reporting a different 
speech act (as I said in Capone 2010) or the indirect report ends up 
being offensive to the audience, then an interpretative problem arises 
and the interpretative ambiguity I discussed at the beginning of this 
paper arises, which needs to be resolved by pragmatic interpretation. 
So Davis might now be relieved by my conclusion that like him I do 
not think that every word of the original utterance must be in the 
that-clause of the indirect report.
Consider now a different case. I happened to send a paper to P 
& C. During the proofs something strange happened. I had no reply 
to my corrections and no revised proofs were sent to me. The result 
was that an uncorrected paper was published. Thomas Gray, whom 
I cited to embellish the paper, became Thomas Grey. Although the 
Press is now remedying this problem, which really horrified me (but 
was just one case out of many of bad publishing), I was certainly not 
happy to have been reported as saying that Thomas Grey and NOT 
Thomas Gray had written the Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard. 
I certainly object to my having been reported in that way. I understand 
that these things happen, but the real problem is when indirect report-
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ers are either inaccurate and sloppy or dishonest. So there must be 
something general in defense of my principle.
10. ON TRANSLATION
Translation may be a problematic area in the issue of indirect reports. 
While my form/style principle predicts that forms should be as close 
as possible to those of the original utterances (and utterers), I have 
allowed, in some cases, that the principle can and must be surmounted 
in case heavy contextual clues indicate that the words originally utte-
red cannot be in the language of the indirect report. In other words, it 
is possible that the original utterance is in Russian, while the reporting 
utterance is in English or Italian. I have also made it clear that, even 
when the context does not make us suspicious that the original utte-
rance was in a language different from the one of the indirect report, 
we should not expect a coincidence between every word in the repor-
ting utterance and every word in the reported utterance (the original 
utterance). We expect Relevance to be involved in selecting the lexical 
items which are under the scope of the Form/Style Principle.
Now suppose that there are some slurring expressions in the 
that-clause of the indirect report, which as the context may indicate, is 
expressed in a language non-coincident with that of the reported utter-
ance. What should we make of those slurring expressions? Should we 
ignore them altogether, assuming that due to the translation we should 
give up the hope of reconstructing the original speaker’s words? While 
I must agree that, in this case, things are much more complicated, my 
intuition is that the words used by the indirect reporter/translator still 
give us some indication as to the general quality of the words used by 
the original speaker. The use of a slur in the that-clause of an indirect 
report, in my opinion, should correspond to a use of a slur in the re-
ported utterance. And this may be imputed to some presumed Princi-
ple of Translation:
Do not translate an expression occurring in the original utterance (report-
ed) with a word which gives the impression that the original speaker was 
slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc. unless the original speaker was 
indeed slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc.
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In other words, the form/style principle seems to survive de-
spite the complications of translation. The Principle of Translation, 
in fact, seems to be necessitated by the Form/Style Principle. In fact, 
even by translating one can somehow give the hearer some indica-
tion about the original voice. It is not a matter of words, but of style, 
and thus despite the fact that the words may be different, because 
they come from a different language, the style seems to be preserved 
despite translation.
These may not be the final words on the matter, but I take these 
to be an important step forward.
11. CONCLUSION
The issue of indirect reports is very important in so far as it is a the 
testing bed for a theory of pragmatics. In this paper, we have seen 
that indirect reporting is a social activity which can be described 
in terms of language games that regulate possible transformations. 
Unlike direct reports, indirect reporting involves – with some nota-
ble exceptions – speaker’s meaning and can involve transformations 
such as deletions, additions, syntactic amendments, but most impor-
tantly involves the phenomenon of voicing, as an indirect report can 
express a number of different voices, being a polyphonic language 
game. The pragmatic task for the hearer is to separate such voices on 
the basis of abstract universal principles of cognition or of language 
use or on the basis of heavy contextual clues which orient the hearer 
towards the right direction. In this paper, my main claim has been 
that when a slur is present in the that-clause of an indirect report, 
responsibility for the slurring expression is assigned to the reported 
speaker. I have offered a complex battery of arguments to prove that 
this must be acceptable.
Alessandro Capone
Università di Palermo
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